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a b s t r a c t
Intentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the
last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project of finding the neural implementation of
intentions, and a number of areas have been posited as implementing these states. We argue, however,
that the processes underlying action initiation and control are considerably more dynamic and context
sensitive than the concept of intention can allow for. Therefore, adopting the notion of ‘intention’ in
neuroscientific explanations can easily lead to misinterpretation of the data, and can negatively influence
investigation into the neural correlates of intentional action. We suggest reinterpreting the mechanisms
underlying intentional action, and we will discuss the elements that such a reinterpretation needs to
account for.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Actions are generally thought to be the result of a preceding
intention to act. You intend to grasp the cup in front of you, and
subsequently (and consequently) you grasp the cup. Upon being
asked why you grasped the cup, you will probably reply by stating
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your further intentions concerning the cup, e.g. drinking from it, or
putting it in the dish washer. Our daily communicative practices
are full of ‘intention talk’. By formulating intentions we can
describe, explain and predict our own behavior and that of others.
This ‘folk psychological’ use of the concept of intention conceives
of intentions as clearly identifiable, relatively simple mental states,
free from context-specific details, that are the originating causes of
subsequent action planning and motor movement. As such, the
notion of intention figures in a variety of contexts, including
psychology (Meltzoff, 1995), and philosophical theories of action
(Bratman, 1987; Davidson, 1963). More recently, the folk concep-
tion of intention has been adopted in neuroscientific studies into
willed action. For example, Haggard summarizes the role the
notion plays in computational neuroscience as follows: “In com-
putational motor control, for example, actions begin with a
relatively simple description of a goal (e.g. ‘I will stand up’). The
brain must expand this task-level representation into an extremely
detailed movement pattern [and] specify the precise kinematics of
all participating muscles and joints. Generating this information is
computationally demanding. The brain's solution to the problem
may lie in the hierarchical organization of the motor system.
Details of movement are decided at the lowest level of the motor
system possible” (Haggard, 2005).
Attempts to localize the neural correlates of intentions, how-
ever, yield diverging results. For example, Lau, Rogers, Haggard
and Passingham (2004) asked subjects to attend to their own
intentions while performing an action, and found increased
activation in the pre-SMA region of the medial prefrontal cortex.
Haynes et al. (2007) report finding neural activation specific to
subjects' intentions to either subtract or add in the medial
prefrontal cortex (more anterior than Lau et al. reported), as well
as lateral prefrontal cortex (see Section 5 for a discussion of these
findings). As a last example, Carota et al. (2010) report that Broca's
area and parietal areas control the intention to speak. If intentions
are indeed context-free, amodal and high-level states, as sug-
gested by Haggard's quote above, it is rather puzzling that they are
reported to be localized in such wide-ranging areas, which seem to
be related to the modality of the subsequent action.
There are also a variety of different reports about the time-
course of intentions and their relation to action. Libet (1985)
famously showed the existence of an action-related readiness
potential 300 ms prior to the reported conscious intention. More
recently, Soon, Brass, Heinze and Haynes (2008) were able to
predict a decision to make a left or right index finger movement
fromMRI data up to 10 s prior to the reported time of decision. But
if intentions are supposed to be the direct causes of actions, it is
not clear why they should exhibit such a broad range of temporal
relationships to the actions they are posited to cause.
If each of these investigations is looking for the same
thing – namely, discrete intentions – then they produce seemingly
conflicting anatomical and temporal localizations for the same
type of mental state. We suggest that the disagreement is an effect
of the assumption that a discrete state is responsible for the
subsequent actions. This assumption is, we believe, based on two
ideas. First, the consequences of action control – i.e. actions – also
have an apparently1 discrete nature. It is therefore assumed that
the mechanisms responsible for this output must also make use of
discrete states. Second, there is the, perhaps implicit, idea that the
way in which we conceptualize intentions in our daily descriptions
and explanations of behavior, capture the basic properties of the
neurophysiological states implementing them.
However, a conceptual taxonomy utilized for daily social
interaction (‘folk psychology') need not offer a valid framework
for research in cognitive neuroscience. Moreover, as we will argue
throughout, the presence of seemingly discrete outputs from a
process does not mean that the process itself contains or involves
discrete internal states. In this paper we argue that investigations
of intentional action at the neural level should consider intentions
as considerably more dynamic and context dependent than our
everyday manner of speaking about them suggests. We will
discuss evidence that action control, specifically as implemented
in the prefrontal cortex, is based on dynamic processes that are
continuously updated and deeply sensitive to perceptual and
motor context, and we will argue that these characteristics are
incompatible with discrete intentions.
Consequently, our view suggests a substantively different
approach to a neuroscience of willed action. Instead of using
discrete states as part of the explanation of action control, it
becomes cognitive neuroscience's project to explain how states
that are stable enough to plan and control action can occur in a
dynamic and context-sensitive structure. We will briefly sketch
the outlines of such an alternative approach. To begin, however,
we will briefly discuss the properties of the folk notion of
intention, and its philosophical counterparts.
2. The folk notion of intention and its characteristics
The notion of ‘intention' plays an important part in our folk
psychology, our everyday framework of explaining the behaviors
of ourselves and others (Anscombe, 1957; Davies & Stone, 1995;
Haselager, 1997; Stich, 1983). There has been intense philosophical
debate about the theoretical status of folk psychology in general
(e.g. Churchland (1989), Fodor (1987), Greenwood (1991)). Here,
we attempt a slightly different approach, by focusing mainly on
the supposed evidence for a folk psychological category – inten-
tion – and examining whether the empirical data provide genuine
support for such a notion. We will therefore not discuss the
philosophical literature on the topic in detail. Two characteristics
of the folk notion of intention are important for our project:
Intentions are generally conceived of as being (1) context-inde-
pendent, and (2) discrete states. We will discuss these two
properties in more detail below.
2.1. Context-independence
Pacherie (2008), Searle (1983), and Bratman (1987) argue that
the content of a particular intention is independent of the
perceptual, affective, and cognitive context in which it is imple-
mented, and therefore each particular intention needs to be
subsequently embedded into a context in order to cause an
appropriate action. This is not to say that these philosophers claim
that the forming of an intention is always independent of a
context: a specific context, say seeing fruits in the supermarket,
can help bring about an intention to eat an apple (for instance, by
causing a desire for an apple). What is meant is that the content of
the intention 'I will eat an apple’ is the same irrespective of the
color or shape of the apples one intends to grasp, or the particular
perceptual surroundings at the time or the reason for grasping
them.2 This context-independence allows one to form intentions
1 We say ‘apparently discrete’, because what is taken to be ‘the action’ in an
ongoing stream of behavior is also a matter of interpretation (see also Barker
(1963).
2 It is also possible that one could encode specific properties of the intended
outcome. One might form the intention, for example, to grasp a red apple at the
Acme next Thursday. (cf. the ‘neurotic planner’ in Pacherie and Haggard (2010). One
could, however, form this intention at any time, and it remains unchanged
regardless of, e.g., the properties of the apple one eventually decides to grasp, or
the room one is in when entertaining the intention. The important point is that
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about future actions in a different context, such as picking-up
groceries after work (Pacherie, 2008). Consequently, particular
intentions retain their characteristics across different instances. If
you intend to grasp an apple today, the intention is the same as
when you intended to grasp an apple last week, or last year.
2.2. Discreteness
Next, intentions are thought to be discrete mental representa-
tions. A system implements discrete representations, according to
Dietrich and Markman (2003), if it contains “more than one
representation, and the representations are bounded and uniquely
identifiable.” In philosophical accounts (and, we believe, in neu-
roscientific contexts), two related forms of discreteness are attrib-
uted to intentions, either implicitly or explicitly. First, intentions
are thought to have discrete content. Content discreteness means
that there are clear boundaries between what the state refers to
and what it does not. Since content discreteness bounds what the
intention refers to, it guarantees that an intention, say the
intention to grab an apple, will apply to all and only acts of
grabbing apples, thus providing the desired generality across
different instances of apple-grabbing, and different contexts (see
also Dietrich and Markman (2003)). Also, the content of a discrete
intention remains unchanged during the course of an action. In
order to keep their content the same, discrete intentions must not
be modified by other processes during the ongoing action
(although they can perhaps be discarded and replaced by other
intentions in light of changing surroundings, for instance if the
presence of a more delicious fruit causes the formation of a new,
alternate intention, namely to grab the alternative fruit).
Next, intentions are thought of as being functionally discrete,
which means that they are cognitive units that play a distinct and
identifiable functional role in the cognitive system (Haselager,
1997; Ramsey, Stich, & Garon, 1999; Stich, 1983). So, the grasping
of an apple is caused by the intention to grasp an apple, and the
absence of the intention would result in not grasping an apple
(except perhaps by accident, or through manipulation). Functional
discreteness also means that the state retains its identity while
causally interacting with other states—the intention to grasp an
apple remains identifiable as that intention throughout the action,
even though it may interact causally with the more complex states
that cause motor behavior.
Content and functional discreteness are closely related, and the
content of an intention is sometimes even attributed based on the
role this state plays in the cognitive system—Dietrich and Mark-
man, for instance “define semantic content […] in terms of the use
to which that information is put” (ibid., p. 97, our italics). For
example, a state can be said to represent the intention to grasp an
apple (content) when it makes us grasp an apple in the appro-
priate situation (function). More generally, Pacherie (2011) claims
that “intentions can have a causal impact on action by virtue of
their contents” (p. 67, our italics) suggesting a tight coupling
between function and content. Finally, it is essential to explana-
tions and predictions of behavior to indicate which intentions play
the causally crucial roles in the production of behavior. Hence
content and causal role of mental states need to be tightly coupled.
Functional and content discreteness do not entail context-
insensitivity, but are related to it. For example, Pacherie (2008, p.
183) specifically posits that it is the abstractness and context-
insensitivity of intentions that allows them to play their functional
role, and discrete states are well-positioned to exemplify this type
of property. Since they are not modified by interactions with other
states, they can be dissociable from contextual details (i.e., distinct
from other states that represent those details) and employed in
multiple different contexts.
2.3. Different levels of intentions
Representations of actions are usually thought of in a hierarch-
ical fashion. On top of the hierarchy one can find future-directed
and context-free intentions involved in long-term planning of
actions that consist of many sub-actions, whereas ‘mid-level’
states involve aspects of the current action context, and at the
bottom states represent the specific movements or actions.3
Generally, the different representations are thought to stand in
causal relationships to each other, with the higher more future-
oriented intentions being the cause of the contextual influences
and motor states, forming a hierarchy of action control (see also
Grafton and Hamilton (2007), Haggard (2008) for the virtually
identical ‘action hierarchy’; Hamilton and Grafton (2007)).
Pacherie (2000, 2008) has done admirable work to make this
general framework empirically tractable (see Haggard, 2008;
Hamilton & Grafton, 2007; Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009;
Ondobaka, Lange, Newman-Norlund, Wiemers, & Bekkering, 2012;
Pezzulo & Castelfranchi, 2009; Wenke, Fleming, & Haggard, 2010
for examples). In her framework (Fig. 1), the most context-free
states are at the top of the hierarchy, and are important for
deliberation and rational control, while all perceptual context
and motor associations take place lower down in the hierarchy.
The higher-level intentions capture the intuitions present in the
folk interpretation of intentions (that they are context-insensitive,
discrete and the originating cause of actions), while the lower-
level intentions are supposed to provide the bridge between these
abstract and deliberative processes on the one hand and physical
movement on the other.
In what follows, we will argue that, despite the intuitive appeal
of the picture, intentions as discrete states that cause our actions
should not be assumed as an explanatory construct when inves-
tigating the neural mechanisms for action control. We will discuss
evidence that the putative function of intentions – that of
Fig. 1. An overview of Pacherie’s “causal cascade” theory of intentional action,
taken from Pacherie (2008).
(footnote continued)
specific perceptual and motor elements of the actual action context are not
represented in the intention.
3 Many philosophers have accounted for this difference by distinguishing
different types of intentions. Searle (1983) contrasts prior intentions and intentions
in action; Bratman (1987) uses future-directed and present-directed intentions,
Pacherie (2008) contrasts distal, proximal and motor intentions, and Pacherie and
Haggard (2010) use prospective and immediate intentions. To our understanding,
they roughly denote the same distinction. Since our main target corresponds to the
context-free type of representation, we will reserve ‘intention’ for context-free
states.
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underlying temporally extended, deliberative action control – is
implemented by the anterior areas of the lateral prefrontal cortex
(lPFC), and that the neural processes that shape action control in
the PFC do not exhibit the typical characteristics of intentions that
we have discussed.
3. Action control in the prefrontal cortex
Based on a variety of evidence from imaging studies, neuro-
physiology, and neuropsychology, the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is
generally recognized to be a primary locus of action generation
and control in the brain (see Miller and Cohen (2001) for an early
review of this evidence). Various models of prefrontal action
control have been proposed (see Badre (2008) and Ramnani and
Owen (2004) for reviews), and while the details of different
models of control differ, the notion of a anterior–posterior axis
within the lateral PFC (lPFC) for implementing different kinds of
control is now widely recognized (Badre, 2008; Fuster, 2004).
Action generation processes in the lPFC, especially in anterior
regions, seem to exhibit the same temporally extended and
deliberative aspects as intentions. For example, Koechlin and
Summerfield (2007), Koechlin, Ody, and Kouneiher (2003) have
suggested and tested a model in which different types of action
coordination are subserved by different areas of the lPFC. Based on
differential activation found in imaging studies, they posit that
posterior areas of the PFC are in charge of selecting between
different “sensorimotor associations,” where these consist of a
learned connection between a stimulus property and a specific
motor act. When different sets of context-dependent associations
must be applied depending on the nature of the stimulus sets
presented, dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC) is activated, performing a
process that they call contextual control. When these contextual
processes are sensitive to certain past events (e.g., which stimuli
have been perceived previously), this is referred to as episodic
control. Lastly, when a task must be paused, and a new set of
associations implemented, due to the presentation of an inter-
rupting stimulus, followed by a return to the first task, the lateral
frontopolar cortex (the most rostral part of the PFC) is activated, a
process they call branching control.
Like intentions, the processes in episodic and branching control
are temporally extended, in the sense that they must keep track of
information longer than other types of control—they involve
maintaining representations of a variety of task rules in order to
act appropriately in response to the presented stimulus. They also
seem to be genuinely deliberative, since they must keep track of a
variety of different considerations, and discern the appropriate
relationships between them, in order to complete tasks effectively.
These studies suggest that the functions attributed to the
regions along the anterior–posterior axis seem to be similar to
the functions of intentions and the several other layers of the
hierarchy. The posterior prefrontal cortex is thought to be involved
in concrete action responses (Badre, 2008); More anterior regions
are progressively involved in more temporally extended and
deliberative action planning (Badre, 2008; Christoff & Gabrieli,
2000; Koechlin et al., 2003), just as intentions are supposed to be.4
So, in behavior requiring branching control, anterior areas would
store the required future associations, as well as the contexts in
which they need to be employed, and initiate processes to apply
the new rules in the appropriate setting. Koechlin et al. (2003)
suggest that a broad “goal representation” is maintained in aPFC
during the performance of sub-tasks, and activates the appropriate
actions at the appropriate times. Burgess, Veitch, de Lacy Costello
and Shallice (2000) interpret the deficits in patients with lesions in
aPFC as an inability to form and carry out intentions, and Ramnani
and Owen (2004) describe the relevant sort of intention along the
lines of such plans as to 'Meet John at 5': an obvious parallel to
future-directed aspect of intentions.
In all, if intentions are to be found in the brain, the most likely
location would be along the anterior–posterior axis of the lPFC.
However, despite the similarities between functions attributed to
the intentional hierarchy and to the processes along the anterior–
posterior axis, we will argue in the next section that the context-
independent, discrete, and causal rendering of intentions is
incompatible with the type of information processing that occurs
in the PFC.
4. The complex and dynamic nature of action control
Intentions, in the folk and philosophical senses, are essentially
simple, discrete, and independent of the context in which the
actions they cause are embedded. In this section we will show that
there is convincing empirical evidence that neural activity in the
anterior regions of the lPFC is informationally as well as dynami-
cally complex. These types of complexity suggest that processing in
the lPFC does not exhibit the type of structure that is attributed to
intentional action generation when looked at from a folk psycho-
logical perspective.
Let us start with informational complexity. A system’s opera-
tions are informationally complex, in our view, if during its normal
operation the system has access to and makes use of a variety of
different sources of information. The anatomy of the lPFC suggests
that it has access to a variety of different sorts of information. The
anterior regions of the lPFC receive input from the medial
temporal lobe and the thalamus, as well as multiple sensory areas,
such as ventral visual areas, somatosensory areas, auditory cortex,
and the rostral superior temporal sulcus, which is itself known to
be a multimodal area (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Ongür & Price, 2000).
While anatomical connections themselves do not impel conclu-
sions about the nature of processing, this connectivity at least
suggests that the resources for informationally complex processing
are present. Direct evidence for informational complexity comes
from physiological studies at multiple spatial scales. In the next
subsections, we discuss a few specific studies that make these
points in detail.
4.1. Single cell studies
Some early single cell studies by Fuster, Bauer and Jervey (1982)
showed evidence that, in monkeys, anterior dorsolateral and
orbital regions of the PFC had specific responses to perceptual
features of the action context, and to the relations between them.
Fuster et al., conclude that these data “provide […] evidence for
the hypothesis that the prefrontal cortex is essential for the
temporal integration of sensory data and motor acts in sequential
behavioral structures” (p.690). Following on these results, Fuster,
Bodner and Kroger (2000) trained monkeys to form an action-
related association between tones and colors. Specifically, the
monkeys had to press a certain color on a touch screen following
the presentation of a certain frequency sound. Single-cell record-
ings were conducted in over 300 neurons spanning areas in the
dorsolateral and anterior prefrontal cortex. In accordance with the
previous findings, they discovered that while some cells encode
the presence of only the tone or only the color, a large quantity of
the cells increased activation in the interim between the presenta-
tion of the tone and the colors, suggesting that these encode the
presence of a relation between tone and color.
4 Pacherie and Haggard (2010, p. 74) cite the dlPFC as being involved in
“selecting actions.” This could be interpreted as the translation of future-directed
intentions to specific motor intentions.
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Fuster et al. (1982) contend that the function of these PFC cells
is to facilitate the integration of perceptual information and,
moreover, to do so over an extended period of time. The cross-
temporal aspects of these neurons’ activity suggests an action
control process that seems to be in line with the cross-temporal
role that intentions are supposed to play; however, the process
seems highly sensitive to specific perceptual information. It is the
presence of the associated stimuli in the perceptual environment
that mediates processing in the lPFC, and this processing is directly
relevant to performing the proper action (via the learned percep-
tual association).
One could maintain that the cells that associate a tone and a
color are encoding a discrete intention, such as “I will press red.”
This would be to invoke the folk notion that perceptual informa-
tion is turned into a context free state, for instance in the neurons
which respond solely to tones (e.g., “the tone is present”), which in
turn is formed into a discrete intention to press the appropriate
color. However, the commitment to discrete states suggests a
stable firing pattern for the duration of the action. This commit-
ment is directly undermined by the dynamical complexity of the
processes that Fuster et al. discuss. We define dynamical complex-
ity as the continuous modification of the state of a system in
accordance with processing and task demands. In accordance with
this definition, the neurons that Fuster et al. (2000) studied which
showed feature-specific associative behavior, showed distinct
behaviors at different states of the action sequence. Some neurons
maintained correlated firing only through certain epochs of
stimulus presentation – for instance, during auditory presentation
and in the delay between stimuli – while others fired consistently
in different stages. Moreover, even the neurons that seem to
represent the association between the stimulus features, as
opposed to neurons that fired for just one of the features – i.e.,
the ones that were discussed above as candidates for encoding the
discrete intentions – did not demonstrate a constant response, but
instead their activity varied in their temporal relations to the onset
stimulus. So, in contradiction to the conditions on positing discrete
representations, the activation of the neurons studied by Fuster
et al. do in fact vary continuously during the period of action
control, and moreover in a way that is sensitive to the fine-grained
temporal progression of the action sequence. In order to maintain
discrete, context-insensitive content for these states, the discrete
theorist seems to be forced into the position of asserting that these
temporal characteristics of activity have no functional role.
4.2. Imaging studies
The properties discussed above are in line with findings of
imaging studies that suggest the presence of informational com-
plexity at the systems-level for all regions of the human lPFC. For
instance, more posterior areas of the lPFC have been implicated in
contexts where associations between visual stimuli and particular
actions (Passingham, Toni, & Rushworth, 2000) need to be recalled
(see also Koechlin et al. (2003), Kouneiher, Charron, and Koechlin
(2009), Rushworth (2008)). This suggests that activity in these
areas is modified depending on whether there is perceptual
information needed to complete a task. Importantly, these effects
are not restricted to posterior regions of the lPFC, as would be
expected if representations became less context-sensitive as one
moved anteriorly along the anterior–posterior axis. Prabhakaran,
Narayanan, Zhao and Gabrieli (2000) compared two conditions
involving tasks cued by verbal and spatial information, one in
which the two types of information were presented separately,
and one in which the verbal and spatial cues coincided. In the
“non-integrated” (first) condition, activation was higher in more
posterior areas of the lPFC, whereas in the “integrated” (second)
condition, activation was considerably higher in more anterior
regions, particularly in the right hemisphere.
The difference between posterior and anterior regions, then, is
not in whether information about perceptual context is processed
in anterior areas, but what kind of context information is processed
—i.e., information about specific environmental features more
posteriorly, and information about relations (e.g., spatiotemporal
coincidence relations) between environmental features more
anteriorly (see also Christoff, Ream, Geddes, and Gabrieli (2003)).
Similarly Ranganath, Johnson and D’Esposito (2000) found that the
left anterior lPFC shows increased activation during tasks where
more specific perceptual information had to be recalled, suggest-
ing not only that informational complexity increases as one moves
more anteriorly along the lPFC axis, but that the overall quantity of
perceptual information that is needed for a task modifies aPFC
activity. These results strongly support informational complexity
in the lPFC. While dynamical complexity is difficult to show with
techniques such as fMRI, the Ranganath et al. (2000) study
suggests that the amount of perceptual detail encoded by these
areas can shift with task demands. Importantly, the evidence
ranges across spatial scales, from individual groups of neurons to
the activity of whole regions.
4.3. Complexity and the folk notion of intention
The types of complexity discussed above are difficult to
reconcile with the three properties of the folk notion of intention
discussed in Section 2; context independence, discreteness and
action causation. First, context-independence: The informational
complexity of the PFC shows that even the most anterior parts of
the lPFC are not context-insensitive in the way demanded by the
core folk notion of intentions. It is problematic to frame the
representation of higher-order relations (e.g., spatio-temporal
ones) between perceptual information in terms of discrete states.
Indeed, if the role that Fuster et al. (1982), (2000), Fuster (2001)
attribute to lPFC neurons of integrating perceptual information
over a period of time is correct, then this context-sensitivity is vital
for the functioning of these areas. Moreover, dynamical complex-
ity suggests a continual dependency on perceptual context. The
view suggested by these results is that branching and episodic
control (Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007) implement their functions
by tracking information relevant to a particular task or task set in
the actor’s perceived environment over time. Branching control,
for instance, attempts to mediate shifting task demands (Collins &
Koechlin, 2012; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Sakai, 2008) with changes
in context, and does so by keeping track of relations between a
variety of different informational sources. On the view suggested
by informational and dynamic complexity, this sort of procedure
can produce temporally extended behaviors without relying on
previously represented, discrete intentions, through dynamic
interaction with a perceptual context. The prospective memory
results also show, importantly, that perceptual context need not be
occurrent—it can be recalled or expected context that allows for
the future-directed aspects of actual action.
Second, the two kinds of complexity also undermine the notion
of intentions as discrete states. Dynamical complexity alone would
be problematic for an attempt to isolate a discrete state from
ongoing processes, since (if Fuster et al.’s results generalize) it
shows that activation in anterior regions of the PFC is continuously
modified from the earliest stages of the task (certain aspects,
however, do remain specific across changes in task context; we
discuss these in Section 5). This speaks against the idea of a
discrete state that begins the action coordination process, and
retains its functional identity and content throughout and action
episode. The additional fact that these processes are embedded in
context up to the highest levels means that it is very unlikely that
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one will be able to isolate a state whose processing or content is
dissociable from the context in which it occurs. Of course, some
elements of the context may remain similar across instances of
apple-grasping (e.g., apples tend to have roughly the same shape
and size across instances), and therefore some elements of the
apple-grasping process may be similar across most instances (e.g.
grip aperture). However, this does not mean that there is a state
somewhere in this process that is discrete and dissociated (con-
tentfully and functionally) from context. As Fuster et al. (2000)
suggest, these shared aspects can simply be due to the influence of
contextual elements that are similar across those instances, thus
arguing that any apparent discreteness here is a by-product of
context-sensitive processes being employed in similar contexts.
The combined results are incompatible with the general view
of the action-hierarchy in which context-free states sit at the top
and cause particular activations of context-sensitive representa-
tions. The informational and dynamical complexity of lPFC control
processes undermine the idea of increasing abstractness or sim-
plicity as one moves up to more deliberative and temporally
extended aspects of actions. Instead, the data discussed above
suggests that there is a different kind of complexity present at
higher levels. At low-level motor control there is complexity with
respect to detailed information regarding motor states – e.g.,
proprioceptive and sensorimotor feedback from the muscles
involved – and detailed plans for how to perform suites of motor
effector movement. At higher, deliberative, levels, there is a
complexity of types of information (e.g., information from multiple
senses, as well as current motor-state, occurring across extended
timescales) and the relations between them. So unlike low-level
control, in which there is complex and detailed information within
a type of information (e.g., effector-specific, or within a single
perceptual-motor mapping), higher levels of control are complex
in that they can process relations between a variety of stimulus
types, rules, outcomes, and temporal contexts. This is far removed
from the folk notion of a simple and discrete state.
We have discussed these results specifically and in detail,
because they straightforwardly exhibit the properties of informa-
tional and dynamical complexity. We take them to be entirely
emblematic; in general, the evidence from single cell and imaging
studies shows that the prefrontal cortex is sensitive to perceptual
information at all levels, and is involved in flexibly mediating this
information in response to context and task demands (Genovesio,
2006; Genovesio, Brasted, Mitz, & Wise, 2005; Mushiake, Saito,
Sakamoto, Itoyama, & Tanji, 2006). In the next section, we discuss
a variety of standard empirical and intuitive motivations for
positing discrete intentions, and argue that none of them provide
genuine reason for doing so.
5. Various motivations for assuming discrete intentions
So far we have suggested that action control in the PFC –
including its most anterior regions – exhibits informational and
dynamical complexity, and that these properties are incompatible
with intentions playing a key causal role in action generation. Yet,
intentions are often assumed to be necessary to explain a wide
range of empirical results. In this section, we discuss a number of
motivations that could lead to the assumption of such discrete
states underlying action control, and we discuss some of the
empirical data that is interpreted using such assumptions. We
show why in our view this work need not be considered to be
evidence for discrete states, and how it can also (and perhaps
better) be interpreted without such assumptions. Throughout, we
will also briefly discuss alternative evidence that speaks against
interpretation in terms of discrete intentions.
5.1. Motivation: We need increasing abstraction to account for
increasing complexity
One compelling intuition is that increasing complexity of control
goes together with increasing abstraction, and decreasing context-
sensitivity. Many results in the action control literature assume that
the structure of tasks is itself hierarchical, with goals at the top of the
hierarchy, and sub-goals nested within it. It is also often assumed that
the hierarchical organization of the control systemmust match that of
the goal hierarchy (Uithol, van Rooij, & Bekkering, 2012). Such a
hierarchical organization brings with it the intuitive assumption that
the higher levels of the control hierarchy operate over more abstract
representations, perhaps ones that are entirely free of context. To a
certain extent such a perspective is encouraged by the model of
Koechlin et al. (2003), Koechlin and Summerfield (2007) that we have
leaned on in our characterization of the PFC. The addition of different
levels of control involves nesting a set of conditional dependencies
between sensorimotor associations—branching control, for instance,
involves interrupting sensorimotor associations in response to new
stimuli, while episodic control makes these cue-action associations
dependent on a background condition which varies per stimulus
block. Thus, the levels of control are themselves hierarchical. This,
however, need not involve more abstract and amodal types of
representations on top of the hierarchy. Higher-level processes can
very well consist of more complex types of associations between
more elements of perceptual and motor context.
To give one example, Badre and D’Esposito (2007) varied task
structure in ways roughly analogous to the control structures
posted by Koechlin et al., and also varied complexity within each
control type. They also found that activity increased anteriorly
with more complex task structure, and moreover that the parti-
cular regions activated in each type of control varied with
increased complexity within the type. They interpret this as
evidence for abstract representation. However, it is questionable
that such an interpretation follows from the results. In the
increased complexity conditions, it was exactly an increase in
the number of, and nesting relations between, sensorimotor
associations that was varied. That is, as the complexity of con-
textual cues that need to be remembered goes up, so does PFC
activation (at each level of control). One would expect that if an
abstract, context-free state was being implemented, then activa-
tion would not change so drastically with the amount of context
tracked.
A related type of interpretation posits that the PFC, specifically
more anterior regions, represents task ‘rules’. Rules are similar to
abstraction in that they are supposed to be distinct from the
material to which the rules apply—e.g., a representation “when
cue X occurs, I must perform task Y,” needs to abstract away from
both X and Y, and the similarity of this kind of representation to
linguistically phrased intentions is obvious. The primary evidence
taken to show such rule implementation comes from situations in
which the perceptual stimulus stays the same, but distinct activa-
tions can be found for different tasks involving that information.
Both imaging (see Sakai (2008), for a review) and single cell results
are often interpreted this way, but we will only discuss singly cell
results for brevity. Genovesio et al. (2005), for example, found
neurons that respond preferentially to different tasks involving the
same contextual information. Moreover, the activity of these
neurons can be initiated before the stimulus is shown, can show
activation even if the particular stimulus-response mappings for a
task are variable, and can be used to predict which task is
performed.
However, the fact that different neurons can be active in
different tasks involving the same perceptual context is not proof
that a discrete intention is being encoded. As Sakai (2008, p. 226)
notes, it is not surprising that different organizations of perceptual
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information should be mediated by different neurons, since
different tasks will demand that this information is grouped in
assorted, specific ways. To see this clearly, take a simplified
example. Suppose that we have two populations of associative
neurons like the ones discussed in regard to Fuster et al.’s (2000)
study above. Now suppose that these associations must in turn be
associated in different ways, as in more highly nested forms of
action control. Suppose that population 1’s association must come
before population 2’s in some contexts, and afterwards in others.
Clearly, something must be distinct to implement the two different
orderings, but this need not be an abstract rule. Instead, distinct
coordinations can be implemented by any mechanism that
imposes an ordering between the two populations—for instance,
different individual or populations of inhibitory interneurons.5
In short, implementing rule-like behavior does not entail the
formation of an abstract, discrete state, which is then applied to
contextual ones that are functionally distinct from it. Rather, this
behavior can emerge from detailed coordination of already existent
contextual representations, by further developed organization in
particular behavioral contexts. Moreover, the possibility that this
organization could even generalize to similar stimuli, or be primed
in task anticipation, is compatible with the idea that what is being
primed is a way of grouping perceptual elements. In other words, the
function implemented by the rules involves mapping certain ele-
ments of stimulus context onto motor action, leaving no need to posit
independent, discrete, abstract states for these effects.
Moreover, other studies using roughly this paradigm can be
construed as providing evidence against discrete intentions.
Simons, Schölvinck, Gilbert, Frith, and Burgess (2006), for instance,
distinguish between what they call ‘cue identification’ and ‘inten-
tion retrieval'. In cue identification trials, subjects had to only
press a button different from the buttons being pressed in ongoing
tasks, while on intention retrieval trials subjects had to perform an
additional and remembered action (e.g. count the syllables in
words and press different keys if the total is less or more than 4. As
in the ‘rule’ results discussed above, in this study the type of
operation was different in the two conditions, while the percep-
tual input was the same. They report that although these two
processes can be contrasted on the behavioral level, they share a
common neural basis in anterior prefrontal cortex. In this study,
‘intention’ is operationalized as increase in demand on internal
storage (see the discussion of heuristics, below), and the study
does not motivate the positing of abstract, discrete, context-free
states. When the different tasks are seen as continuous, but relying
on a different, and perhaps more complex ordering and grouping
of the stimuli, as operationalized in this study, the shared neural
substrate is to be expected.
In line with this, Gilbert et al. manipulated how internally
generated a task is by making the instructions to perform a
previously learned task implicit and abstract rather than concrete
and descriptive. The authors showed a slight preference in lateral
aPFC (versus medial) for a more internal condition. However, like
Simons et al., they reasonably interpret this as a “continuum”
between the mechanisms for the two conditions, rather than a
categorical difference.
5.2. Motivation: There are successful models using discrete states
Intentions have played a role in modeling in psychology as well
as in neuroscientific research, and it might be thought that a
successful behavioral model employing discrete states motivates
the search for discrete neural realizers of those states. For instance,
Collins and Koechlin (2012) build discrete higher-order task
options, or “behavioral strategies,” that determine the particular
actions (in this case, button presses in response to individual
stimuli), into their model of action generation. They show how a
model with distinct, explicit strategy representations can fit a
variety of behavioral data.
We suggest that the success of such a model at the psycholo-
gical or computational “level” cannot be interpreted as evidence
for discrete states implemented in the neural control system. Any
successful psychological model that posits a discrete internal state
shows that, in the behavioral contexts for which it is successful,
the neural control system as a whole must end up at an end state
that matches the output suggested by the psychological model
(e.g., a specific motor action consistent with a particular strategy).
Yet this does not entail either functional discreteness or a single
abstract state representation in the process leading up to that end
result.
As an illustration, consider a range of models of working
memory dealing with sensorimotor associations (Christoff,
Keramatian, Gordon, Smith, & Mädler, 2009; Loh & Deco, 2005;
Loh, Pasupathy, Miller, & Deco, 2008), in which dynamically
interacting neural networks that are completely interconnected
end up settling at discrete outputs. On such models, both incoming
sensory information and background behavioral context are taken
to bias, in a probabilistic sense, the eventual choice of sensor-
imotor association that the network will settle on. Such networks
can switch flexibly between discrete outputs depending on differ-
ent elements of context, and can learn new associations based on
changes in input and reward, despite not being controlled by some
higher-level, more abstract state, and despite not having function-
ally discrete states.
So far, these models have focused mostly on low-level sensor-
imotor associations. However, there is nothing that bars extending
such concepts to more complex elements of contextual informa-
tion and action control—even up to and including the notion of
behavioral strategy or task set. These models are clearly distinct
from a hierarchy on which an abstract intention sits at the top and
determines the processing of lower levels, and posit, via the
biasing relationship, a kind of context-dependent action organiza-
tion that seems more compatible with the context-sensitivity of
PFC processing we have discussed. This is not to say that it will not
be a significant challenge to understand how these (in our view)
more neurally plausible models can match the outputs of high
level psychological models. But there is no conceptual barrier to
the challenge, and given the current state of the neural evidence,
we suggest that it may well be a fruitful research direction.
5.3. Motivation: We need intentions for self-initiated action
Above we showed that even cases of seemingly abstract or
rule-dependent actions can be explained by representations that
serve to coordinate multiple distinct elements of already pre-
sented or expected context. But what if the action is generated not
in response to any external cue, but instead due to a ‘free’ decision.
Does this suggest that a context-free intention must exist to cause
the subject to act in a certain way?
Haynes et al. (2007) used decoding methods on fMRI measure-
ments to find which areas of the PFC predicted ‘freely chosen’
actions, in this case whether to add or subtract two numbers.
While they found a variety of differences in activity, the greatest
predictor was anterior mPFC, from which 71% of eventual choices
could be predicted. In this case, there seems to be no current
perceptual context on which to operate. Soon, Hanxi, Bode and
Haynes (2013) show that these decisions can already be detected
above change well before the subject’s reported onset of the
5 We do not intend to commit to this particular mechanism. In general, so long
as the aPFC has a way of ordering distinct sensorimotor associations, then our
strategy here will be feasible. For evidence that populations of PFC neurons order
subgoals or stimuli in time, see Genovesio (2006) and Mushiake et al. (2006).
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conscious intention. Such results have been reported extensively
using a variety of different methods, and have often been inter-
preted as evidence that conscious intentions are not the cause of
our actions (Haggard, 2011; see for example Soon et al. (2008),
Wegner (2003)). This line of thinking is in our view a step in the
right direction, but we propose to take one further step: in
addition to questioning conscious discrete states, many of the
results we have discussed motivate questioning the causal influ-
ence of discrete states themselves.
We have argued above that for a state to be discrete it has to be
stable across contexts, and it has to be stable during interaction with
other states. We suggest that many of the cases presented as
evidence for the discrete state interpretation rest on the absence
of context in the experimental setup—there are no contextual
features that affect the decision, and the numbers to be added or
subtracted are not presented until after the decision has been made.
Given the two-option forced choice nature of the decision, however,
it is not possible to determine that the separable states represent the
distinct decisions discretely, or play the direct causal role attributed
to intentions. Any two distinctly presented options will have some
noticeable difference in the brain’s response. But this distinct
difference might be due to the experimental setup, rather than
showing that there are inherently context free representations.
Showing that a state is an ‘intention’ in the folk or hierarchical
sense involves showing that it not only is distinct in discretely
presented scenarios, but that this distinction plays a discrete causal
role in the system (i.e., that the distinctness underlies discrete
representations that play the causal roles attributed). Doing so
might not be easy, as context would have to be varied to show this
discrete influence (as per the above). But when context is varied, PFC
processes, as we have discussed, tend to reflect contextual influence.
An interesting alternative suggesting how self-initiated actions
can come about without discrete intentions is provided by Schurger,
Sitt and Dehaene (2012), who modeled the readiness potential as
found in the Libet paradigm, using a leaky integrator, stochastic noise
and a threshold. The rationale behind this model is that both the
‘what’ and the ‘whether’ of an action in the Libet paradigm are fixed.
Combined with the instruction to ‘act whenever you feel like it’ these
experiment specifics make the exact moment of action execution
highly influenced by random noise in the motor system. In a sense,
the ‘decision’ to act in this setup is the crossing of the threshold,
which causes the action to be executed (i.e. the readiness potential is
not caused by a decision to act, it reflects the decision to act).
What the model shows is that a detectable predictor of an
outcome can arise, and look discrete, from within an entirely
continuous system. Such a result could occur in an MRI study if, for
instance, a dynamically interacting network eventually pulls a
particular brain circuit (in this case, the mPFC), into a certain
interpretation (activation pattern) rather than another (compare
the dynamical decision models we discussed in the previous sub-
section). These results show that there is no compelling motivation
for interpreting this interaction in terms of discrete causal influence
of one part of the system on the others, as the discrete
intention model.
Schurger and colleagues explicitly only modeled the ‘when’
of an action decision, but similarly continuous process could
very well underlie the ‘what’ and the ‘whether’ of an action.6
The bottom line – again – is that what can be discretely contrasted
on the behavioral level need not rely on an equally discrete control
mechanism. And as we discussed in relation to behavioral models,
such decoding results can serve as a data point and a useful target
for more dynamical perspectives, without forcing an interpreta-
tion along discrete, hierarchical lines.
5.4. Interim conclusion: Heuristics, concepts, and mechanistic
understanding
In our view, discreteness is more apparent than actual. The way
experiments are set up can make things look discrete, especially by
generalizing in specific ways over certain outcomes. However, it may
well turn out to be that what looks like a discrete state will appear to
be less discrete upon a more detailed inspection. We are not denying
that there are descriptions possible that construe action control
processes as discrete; nor are we denying that these descriptions
could have scientific or heuristic value. In scientific practice, it is often
convenient or even necessary to employ localization heuristics in
initially decomposing a complex system in order to gain tractability
in understanding that system. In neuroscience, claims about repre-
sentational capacities are often used in this respect (see Bechtel
(2003, 2008) for an analysis of this explanatory strategy in a variety
of different neuroscience contexts).
Such heuristic use of a concept can aid investigation by directing
attention to a certain brain region, and by providing general decom-
positions of systems from which to work. However, as discussed in
the introduction to this section, heuristics when taken too literally
can overly constrain thinking about the mechanisms one is studying.
We have pointed out several cases in which all of the hypotheses are
framed in terms of intentions. If these are being used literally, then
they face the empirical and conceptual problems for intentions that
we have discussed. If they are being used as heuristics, then attention
must be paid to how to move past them into a deeper understanding
of action control. How we think about the status of the concept really
matters. For instance, Haynes et al. (2007, p. 324) consider their
result important for thinking about other executive processes, such
as “attending to and thinking about intentions,” as well as a variety of
other control tasks. Should we pursue these questions as though
a discrete control signal is propagated from mPFC (or, speaking
more generally, anywhere where intentions or rules are posited to be
represented), or in terms of the informationally and dynamically
complex interactions we have discussed?We have suggested that the
empirical evidence speaks in favor of the latter, and at the very least
researchers should be clear on the roles for which they employ such
multifarious concepts as ‘intention’. In the last section, we give a brief
outline of how one might approach action control without giving
intentions a primary role.
6. Intentional action without intentions?
We have argued that we should not assume that discrete states
underlie action control, despite apparent discrete output. The
neural data that we have discussed suggests that the idea of a
discrete intention causing and controlling actions from the top of a
representational hierarchy is a mischaracterization of the complex
and dynamic nature of action control. The causal relationship
between a discrete intention and action, and their assumed
6 An interesting result perhaps bridging these perspectives comes from
Momennejad and Haynes (2012), who had subjects perform a complex, percep-
tually cued task while internally keeping track of a time delay, after which they had
to switch to a different task using the same information. The authors used decoding
methods to assess PFC locations at which “what” new task had to be performed and
“when” to perform it could be discerned from activity. They discovered that during
the delay, medial aPFC reflected the “what” of the future task, while lateral aPFC
reflected the “when,” but right before initiating the task change, this reversed, with
(footnote continued)
medial areas predicting “when” and lateral predicting “what”. In combination with
the Simons et al. (2006) results we discussed above, we find this to be indicative of
dynamical complexity, while still involving information localized at particular
times and areas. Much more work, of course, needs to be done to understand the
details of these processes.
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context-independence are all difficult to reconcile with the infor-
mational and dynamical complexity of action planning and neural
control processes found in the lPFC.
In our view, these neural data suggest the need for a reinter-
pretation of intentional action at the neural level. We cannot
present a complete theory in this paper. Instead, we will discuss
the elements that such an alternative interpretation of action
planning needs to account for, or could incorporate, and how
doing so can shape further investigation into action control at the
neural level.
The neural data we have discussed suggest that action control
is accomplished by various interdependent control processes, in
continual interaction with contextual features. A variety of per-
ceptual relations are represented in control areas, depending
on the specific needs of the action context, where these needs
are dynamically changing. The resulting control of behavior thus
emerges from the interaction of the task, the various processes
with each other and with the action environment. With this
in mind, it is easy to diagnose why both spatial and temporal
localization projects have come up with such diverse results—the
situation stems from attempting to apply a single category to a set
of processes that are dynamically driven by task and context.
The difficult problems to solve for a future account of inten-
tional action involve both how to individuate control processes,
and how to explain their interactions. Which tasks can rely on
faster and more direct processes, and which tasks require addi-
tional control processes? In what way do these additional
processes influence the more direct ones? Several models of action
control in the PFC, including some that we have discussed
(Christoff & Gabrieli, 2000; Courtney, 2004; Koechlin et al.,
2003; Petrides, 2005), have already begun to make progress on
these questions. Here we give a few ideas on how these models
and findings could be integrated into an alternative account of
intentional action.
Although the details and approaches of various models differ,
they seem to converge on the idea that the more rostral an area,
the more informationally complex and temporally extended the
control processes it exhibits. Since different elements of action
control instantiate different relations between perceptual infor-
mation, a complete account of intentional action will have to
explain how both stable action features short term motor control
emerge from different relations between distinct sorts of percep-
tual information (see also Cisek (2007), Cisek and Kalaska (2010),
Kiebel Daunizeau and Friston (2008), Uithol, van Rooij, Bekkering
and Haselager (2012) and Yamashita and Tani (2008)).
Consider the problem that a control system has to solve in the
context of complex action planning, say finding the right type of
spaghetti at the supermarket. A variety of goals and subgoals –
with their concomitant perceptual cues and motor tasks – need to
be coordinated in such a way that the distal temporal end-state is
reachable via a series of successive previous states, each of which
must be ordered in relation to each other in space and time.
Moreover, the system must be sensitive to changes in the external
environment. A problem at a given stage necessitates the re-
coordination of an indeterminate number of intermediate stages,
which must be adjusted flexibly, accurately, and perhaps quickly,
in order to reach the end-state. In addition, unforeseen intervening
stimuli must be judged to be relevant or irrelevant, and the correct
ordering of spatial and temporal sub-tasks must be maintained
despite distracters.
The hierarchical models by Koechlin et al. (2003), Koechlin and
Summerfield (2007) and others, suggest that more posterior areas
of the control network are more limited in the types of perceptual
associations they can implement, and in their degree of flexibility.
Thus, posterior areas might be in charge of looking for particular
elements of the action context that are relevant to achieving the
goal (e.g., picking the right package from the shelf), higher areas
might be involved coordinating the large number of these
spatially-indexed subgoals, and ordering them in space and time,
such that one can efficiently walk down the pasta aisle, avoiding
distractions, while still procuring all of the ingredients needed for
dinner.
Even if some detail is lost in this process, this does not entail
that contextual information is not relevant or processed. Once
again, on the view suggested by informational and dynamical
complexity, higher levels of action control involve broader (both
spatially and temporally) and more flexible associations between
elements of perceptual and motor context, not an abstraction away
from all elements of that context. The amount of perceptual detail
at which these representations operate might even vary given task
constraints, comporting nicely with the data of Prabhakaran et al.
(2000) discussed above.
One way to create the flexible associations necessary for action
control might be found in Hommel’s (2004) ‘event files,’ which
are multi-layered networks of bindings that temporarily link
perceptual events, the current task context, and a possible action.
The flexible and heterogeneous composition of these files provides
the flexibility and context-dependency that is needed for action
control, but that is lacking in the notion of intention. An existence
proof for the possibility of such emergent or implicit control
structures can be found in the modeling work by Botvinick
and Plaut (2004, 2006). Despite the absence of explicit processing
hierarchies, these models were able to successfully simulate
human action planning.7
As briefly mentioned above, another way to craft the action
control structure is using the notion of ‘task set’ (Sakai, 2008).
A task set, in Sakai, 2008’s p. 232 phrasing, is “a configuration of
perceptual, attentional, mnemonic, and motor processes”—that is,
the neural network involved in implementing a specific task
involves a number of brain areas operating in parallel to coordi-
nate the perceptual and motor processes relevant for the task. If
the processes included in a task are viewed as in continuous and
dynamic interaction with perceptual and motor processes, and not
attributed the role of primary initiator of an action, the notion of
‘task set’ becomes far more compatible with the informational and
dynamical complexity of the neural processes we have discussed
above. We should not, however, fall into the same trap as with
intentions, by assuming that these ‘task sets’ must embody
contentfully and functionally discrete states, or that the mechan-
isms underlying them can always be contrasted discretely. Even if
they result in stable outcomes, task sets themselves may be
comprised entirely of context-dependent and dynamic processes.
As stressed, this is not a stand-alone theory of action control,
but a perspective that might be taken towards research into the
neural processes underlying intentional action. The proposed
alternative perspective shifts attention away from localization, as
one would expect a control system of the type outlined above to
be in continual and various interactions with both perceptual and
motivational information. Here, however, is where research is
most needed. What areas implement what types of sensorimotor
associations, precisely? What process implements these associa-
tions (e.g. thus far mainly activation is considered, but patterns of
7 There is a considerable debate about whether these models or more discrete
structures better capture action control (Cooper & Shallice, 2006b, 2006a). Much of
the debate surrounds whether there must be a processing or representational
hierarchy at all. While two of us have criticized the idea of a top-down action
hierarchy elsewhere (Uithol et al., 2012), we, as discussed, see no problem with
positing a processing hierarchy of some type being present in the PFC. What is at
stake is whether we describe the difference between levels in terms of increasing
abstractness and context-insensitivity, or instead as differences in elements of
perceptual context represented.
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interaction and neural synchrony might contribute as well). What
elements of the known complex anatomy in lPFC and surrounding
areas implement these functions? How does the interaction of
such processes produce “decisions” about what course of action to
take (which are entirely attributed to discrete intentions on the
folk view)? How should action understanding be framed if it is not
about inferring intentions (Uithol & Paulus, 2013)? Theoretical
frameworks need to be developed in order to both account for the
current data and inform this type of investigation, and we have
suggested that such processes should take the informational and
dynamical complexity of the brain as a starting point.
7. Conclusion
Despite its importance in folk psychological explanation, phi-
losophical accounts of action, and psychological modeling, we
have argued that the notion of ‘intention’ may not be the most
fruitful theoretical construct for investigation into the neural
processes underlying action generation and control. There are no
convincing reasons to assume the existence of such states under-
lying action control, and we have discussed evidence suggesting
the absence of such states in the neural mechanisms that produce
intentional action. We have shown that those aspects of an
action that are normally thought to rely on intentions – such
as temporally extended action planning and control – can be
accounted for by neural processes that do not posses any of the
characteristics of intentions. From this we conclude that research
into intentional action is better served by studying how structures
that are stable enough to control complex actions could emerge
from the interaction of various control processes. Much work has
to be done to expand these elements into a full-blown theory.
How, for instance, are multiple types of information integrated,
both across modalities and across time? How precisely are these
processes shaped by the context of the action? These are difficult
problems that tend to be obscured by a reliance on our intuitive
understanding of intention, rooted in folk psychology. We believe
that addressing them straightforwardly can lead to important
progress in understanding intentional action.
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